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Abstract: This paper examines the fiscal policy options that were available to Latin American 
countries at the onset of the current global economic crisis.  It concludes that most of the major 
countries in the region possessed the fiscal space (as measured by credible fiscal sustainability 
and debt headroom) to run prudent countercyclical fiscal deficits.  For those countries, the 
appropriate policy response involved a constrained fiscal expansion focused on productive public 
spending and financed by drawing on the “rainy day” funds - in the form of large stocks of 
foreign exchange reserves - that they accumulated in prior years, rather than by market 
borrowing.  It shows that the recent surge in multilateral financial activity to alleviate market 
illiquidity, whether intended for reserve or budget support, strengthens the case for this policy 
prescription: with multilateral support, the appropriate policy response is more expansionary, and 
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1. Introduction 
The  current  financial  crisis  has  been  the  most  severe  and  widespread  that  the  international 
economy has experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Although it originated in the 
United States, the crisis spread internationally very quickly.  Developing countries in particular 
were affected through various channels, both financial and real.  The financial channels include 
sharp contractions in domestic asset prices and capital outflows, while the real channels include 
reductions in export volumes, declines in the prices of primary commodities, and reduced flows 
of workers’ remittances. 
The worldwide nature of the crisis has generated a debate both in each affected nation as 
well as in all of the major international financial organizations about the appropriate nature of the 
policy response.  The complicating factors in addressing this issue are that the crisis manifested 
itself in different forms in different countries, that the effectiveness of the policy instruments 
available to confront it is likely to differ country by country, that each country faces country-
specific constraints and tradeoffs in deploying such policy instruments, and that countries differ 
in the weights that they place on different policy objectives.  Not surprisingly, therefore, there 
has been much international disagreement about appropriate policy responses, and individual 
countries have implemented quite different policies. 
  This paper considers the challenge of crisis policy from the perspective of Latin America.  
Its particular concern is with the appropriate role for countercyclical fiscal policy in response to 
the crisis.  This issue was hotly debated within the region in the early stages of the crisis, and 
prominent voices argued for fiscal restraint, for reasons similar to those used to justify fiscal 
restraint  more  recently  in  many  countries  outside  the  region  –  i.e,  to  safeguard  market 
confidence.  In the event, breaking with the past, countries in Latin America indeed undertook 
moderate fiscal stimulus. Instead of engineering fiscal restraint, fiscal balances in 2009 were 
allowed to accommodate the downturn in almost every country in the region.
3 In the typical 
country, the primary fiscal balance in 2009 deteriorated with respect to 2008 by 2.4 points of 
GDP, 1.4 points due to lower fiscal revenues and one point on account of higher expenditures. 
                                                 
3 With the exception of the Dominican Republic.   2
Countercyclical  fiscal  policy  was  behind  not  only  spending  expansion  but,  in  part,  revenue 
contraction due to lowering taxes. This impulse is planned to continue to some extent over 2010. 
  Recovery is currently under way in Latin America.   Since there were other forces driving 
that recovery, however (such as fast-growing demand for the region’s primary products from 
booming economies in Asia), the contribution of fiscal stimulus to the region’s recovery remains 
to be established.  However, the question remains: was countercyclical fiscal policy an ex ante 
mistake that proved to be less harmful ex post because of fortunate developments in trade with 
Asia?    Or  have  at  least  some  economies  in  the  region  evolved  to  the  point  where  a 
countercyclical fiscal stance – which indeed represents a significant break from the region’s past 
– was appropriate ex ante in light of the severity of the crisis?  The question is an important one, 
because it  speaks to  the  crucial  issue  of  whether,  after  two decades  of reform,  the  region’s 
macroeconomic institutions and circumstances have placed it in a position to be able to actively 
pursue macroeconomic stability in response to external shocks, rather than exercise restraint for 
the sake of preserving market confidence. In the event that the current recovery turns out not to 
be sustained, or that an independent new crisis appears on the horizon in the near future, the 
formulation of an appropriate policy response requires that this question be addressed. 
Because  theory  suggests  that  the  answer  is  likely  to  depend  on  country-specific 
conditions, we illustrate some of the important factors to be considered by focusing on the case 
of the seven largest  economies in the region (the  LAC-7 countries, consisting of Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela).  In a previous paper (Fernández-Arias 
and Montiel 2009), we  argued that for several of these countries, the right policy was a program 
of “constrained” fiscal expansion financed with multilateral support and drawing down some of 
the large stocks of foreign exchange reserves that they had previously accumulated as “rainy-
day” funds. In the current paper we review our argument in light of the actual experience. In 
retrospect, we find that fiscal policy actually exercised by these countries has indeed been an 
important component of an appropriate countercyclical response.  
   The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section we examine the state of 
vulnerability of the major Latin American economies at the outset of the crisis.   Section 3 
provides  a  brief  overview  of  policy  responses  that  have  been  implemented  elsewhere,  and 
considers  the  pros  and  cons  of  implementing  similar  policies  in  Latin  America.    Section  4   3
presents our case for the view that constrained fiscal expansion was indeed appropriate ex ante in 
many countries in the region, while Section 5 describes and evaluates several potentially serious 
objections  to  our  recommendations.    The  concluding  section  compares  the  paper’s  policy 
prescriptions  with  the  policies  actually  implemented  by  the  seven  major  Latin  American 
countries.       
2. Vulnerability 
The international crisis was transmitted to Latin America through reduced export volumes, less 
abundant and more expensive external finance, deterioration in the terms of trade, and reduced 
flows  of  worker  remittances.      The  implications  that  these  shocks  had  for  Latin  American 
economies,  however,  were  determined  by  the  extent  of  vulnerability  that  these  economies 
exhibited  when  the  shocks  arrived.    In  this  respect,  the  news  was  relatively  good  in  Latin 
America at the time the crisis broke out: while the reforms of the 1990s may have left the region 
more exposed to external shocks, they also rendered it more resilient in the face of such shocks.  
There are several aspects to the region’s enhanced resiliency. 
  First, a key source of macroeconomic vulnerability is the health of the financial system, 
as the United States and several other industrial countries have rediscovered to their dismay.  As 
the  result  of  financial  reforms  undertaken  over  the  past  decade  and  a  half,  including 
improvements  in  financial  regulation  and  supervision,  enhanced  competition  in  the  financial 
system, and in some cases the recent resolution of banking crises, the financial systems of Latin 
American countries were healthier at the outbreak of the current crisis than they have been in the 
past. The entry of foreign banks has also significantly contributed to the health of the system.
4  
Moreover, Latin American financial institutions did not acquire the “toxic assets” that caused so 
much trouble in many industrial countries, so they did not experience the direct hit suffered by 
financial institutions in those countries. 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that, while the presence of foreign banks could enhance the health of the domestic financial system, it could at the same time 
strengthen the channels of transmission of financial shocks arising in the “center” countries.  This would be so if such banks transmit home 
country liquidity shocks or adopt home-country capitalization levels in response to a financial crisis.  To date, however, foreign banks in these 
countries do not appear to have behaved differently from domestic ones in ways that would magnify their role in crisis transmission (see Cetorelli 
and Goldberg 2009).   4
  Second, central banks have been strengthened as macroeconomic institutions in several of 
the major countries in the region. Not only have they been accorded legal independence, but they 
have  taken  responsibility  for  maintaining  low  and  stable  inflation  rates,  and  to  a significant 
extent they have achieved that goal in recent years, enhancing their credibility.  The increased 
anti-inflationary credibility of central banks in the region has increased their scope for engaging 
in countercyclical policies without destabilizing inflationary expectations. 
Third,  many  of  the  major  countries  in  the  region  have  transitioned  to  more  flexible 
exchange  rate  arrangements,  reducing  vulnerability  to  the  disruptive  discrete  exchange  rate 
depreciations  that are  associated  with  currency  crises  and  providing  an  automatic  stabilizing 
effect in response to external financial shocks.  Bilateral exchange rates against the US dollar 
indeed  depreciated  quickly  in  all  of  the  LAC-7  countries  when  the  external  financial 
environment turned adverse in the fall of 2008.
5  Moreover, despite still being pronounced in 
some countries, financial dollarization has declined in the region, reducing the impact of a factor 
that  has  weakened  or  even  reversed  the  otherwise  expansionary  effect  of  exchange  rate 
depreciation in the past.
6  
Fourth, fiscal reforms have enhanced the flexibility of fiscal systems in some cases and 
many countries in the region have demonstrated both the political will and economic ability to 
make  significant  fiscal  adjustments.    Coupled  with  the  reform  of  fiscal  institutions  in  some 
countries (such as the Structural Balance Rule in Chile and the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 
Brazil), these reforms have enhanced fiscal credibility while at the same time strengthening the 
effects of automatic fiscal stabilizers.  
Fifth,  the  combination  of  fiscal  restraint  and  healthy  growth  performance  for  several 
years before the outbreak of the crisis resulted in significant reductions in public debt stocks as a 
proportion of GDP in the LAC countries as a group.  The average ratio of public debt to GDP for 
a group of countries representing more than 90 percent of regional GDP declined from over 60 
percent in 2003 to about 37 percent by 2007.    
                                                 
5 In addition to the standard expenditure-switching channels, such depreciations have played a stabilizing role in some countries (especially 
Mexico) by increasing the domestic-currency value of workers’ remittance flows. 
6 To the extent that currency mismatches are induced by fixed exchange rate regimes combined with lax financial regulation, improved regulation 
and more flexible exchange rate management could be behind the reduction in the extent of such mismatches in Latin America. 
   5
In  addition  to  these  institutional  reforms  and  improved  performance  in  the  financial, 
monetary, exchange rate, and fiscal policy areas, a specific policy decision has also contributed 
to  reducing  the  region’s  vulnerability  to  adverse  external  shocks:  the  accumulation  of  large 
stocks of international reserves.  These reserves increased tenfold from 1990 to 2008 (from about 
US  $50  billion  to  about  US  $500  billion).    They  have  been  accumulated  both  to  prevent 
undesired  appreciation  of  domestic  currencies  as  well  as  to  serve  as  self-insurance  against 
sudden stops of capital inflows (i.e., to serve as “rainy day funds”).  They now represent large 
stocks of liquid public sector assets that can be deployed to prevent excessive exchange rate 
depreciation, if desired, or to finance temporary fiscal deficits or other fiscal outlays to support 
recovery, if necessary. 
Moreover, these reserves were quickly strengthened by liquidity agreements with the US 
Fed (Brazil and Mexico benefited from liquidity commitments of $30 billion each) and massive 
IMF  resources  pledged  by  G20  countries  to  be  used  in  new  low-conditionality  programs.   
Though these liquidity arrangements have since expired, they signify favorable changes in the 
international environment  from  the  perspective of  the  region’s  access  to  external sources  of 
liquidity in crisis times. 
All of these factors explain why the very large external shock that the international crisis 
represented for Latin America proved to be less disruptive in many countries than the region’s 
history  might    have  led  one  to  expect.    In  this  new  environment,  the  traditional    sudden 
disruptions associated with banking and currency crises have been rendered less likely in Latin 
America.  Most  important,  perhaps,  is  that  policy  has  been  empowered:    financial  and 
macroeconomic policy institutions have more credibility (thereby making short-run deviations 
from medium-term policy  stances less disruptive to expectations), and policymakers have means 
at their disposal to counter shocks – in the form of large reserve stocks – that have not been 
available in the past.       
  On the other hand, it would be easy to exaggerate the region’s resiliency.  First, aside 
from increased financial and real openness, some countries have implemented reforms that have 
made them less resilient in the face of the types of shocks that the region has been experiencing.  
For example, formal dollarization in Ecuador and El Salvador have deprived these countries of 
monetary and exchange rate policies as stabilization instruments. Second, the reforms mentioned   6
above have not been carried out uniformly throughout the region, and in many cases they are 
both recent and fragile – i.e., it may be too early to take credibility gains for granted.  Finally, 
and  perhaps  most  importantly,  although  public  debt  stocks  have  been  reduced  significantly 
relative  to  the  size  of  the  relevant  economies,  they  remain  uncomfortably  large  for  many 
countries in the region, and few countries have achieved a state of safe fiscal solvency.  This not 
only makes the perceived solvency of their governments vulnerable to increased public sector 
debt-servicing  costs,  but  also  makes  it  more  difficult  to  undertake  a  countercyclical  fiscal 
response, as we shall discuss below. 
3. Countercyclical policies in Latin America: Pros and Cons 
The policy response to the crisis in industrial countries focused on restoring the health of the 
financial system where that was perceived to have been imperiled, and attempting to sustain 
aggregate demand in order to avoid a continued sharp contraction of real economic activity.  
Inflation initially dropped off the radar screen as a primary policy concern – in fact, if anything, 
deflation became  a  more  prominent  worry.
7    Outside  Latin  America,  some emerging-market 
economies – most prominently China –responded by quickly adopting expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies.   
  The policy response in industrial countries has taken several forms: 
a. Expansionary monetary policy  
  All of the major central banks in industrial economies have moved to near-zero policy 
interest rates.  For example, the daily average federal funds rate in the United States was at 
approximately 0.2 percent in early March of 2009 and has remained there since, and the ECB, 




                                                 
7 Although some observers worried that the “quantitative easing” undertaken by many central banks and the larger fiscal deficits that emerged in 
many industrial countries would ignite inflationary pressures, this was a distinctly minority view.   7
b. “Quantitative easing”  
  In  countries  where  credit  markets  have  frozen  up,  public  agencies,  especially  central 
banks, essentially took up the financial intermediation function by purchasing the liabilities of 
financial  intermediaries,  purchasing  mortgages,  and  even  engaging  in  direct  lending  to 
manufacturing enterprises.  In the United States, the Federal Reserve System initially funded 
these operations by selling U.S.  government obligations, which were in high demand as the 
result of the international flight to safety, but after the late summer and fall of 2008 it did so by 
dramatically expanding the monetary base (more than doubling the size of its balance sheet), in a 
process referred to as “quantitative easing.”  
c. Recapitalization of financial institutions. 
  Where credit froze up  because of doubts  about the solvency of  financial institutions, 
industrial-country governments moved aggressively to try to restore the health of the system by 
recapitalizing it, providing funds to financial institutions in return for non-voting shares.  The 
governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in particular acquired large stakes in 
their countries’ financial sectors. 
d. Fiscal expansion. 
  With  policy  interest  rates  already  at  near-zero  levels,  many  industrial  –  and  some 
emerging  market  –  countries  undertook  substantial  countercyclical  fiscal  expansions  to 
supplement monetary policy.  The United States was been particularly aggressive in this regard, 
enacting a program of spending packages and tax cuts that  resulted in a fiscal deficit in excess of 
12  percent  of  GDP  in  2009.    Much  more  modest  fiscal  expansion  packages  were  also  
implemented  in  Japan  and  Western  Europe,  but  a  relatively  ambitious  one,  focusing  on 
infrastructure investment, was implemented in China.   
  Should the crisis response in Latin America have been on a similar scale?  There is at 
least  one  obvious  reason  to  give  an  affirmative  answer:  as  in  many  of  the  countries  that 
implemented  aggressive countercyclical  policies,  Latin  America  faced  a  sharp  contraction  in 
aggregate demand at a time of subdued inflation.  As in countries such as China, Latin American 
countries were confronted with a very deep externally-driven contraction in aggregate demand.    8
At the same time, as in industrial countries, inflation was not a serious policy concern in the vast 
majority of Latin American countries (Venezuela was an exception).  Instead, the worry was that 
the  externally-driven  reduction  in  aggregate  demand  would  induce  severe  reductions  in  real 
economic activity, as indeed began to happen in the fourth quarter of 2008 in countries such as 
Brazil and Mexico.  The value of fiscal and monetary flexibility – in which many countries in the 
region have made substantial investments – is precisely so that policy can play a stabilizing role 
in situations such as that in which Latin America found itself in 2008.   
On the other hand, a negative answer is suggested by three considerations: 
  First, the shock that Latin America suffered from was different from that which afflicted 
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom.  Specifically, it did not manifest 
itself in the form of a domestic financial crisis, but of a combination of adverse real and financial 
external shocks of large magnitudes.  This is a potentially important observation, because it plays 
a role in the desirability of a countercyclical fiscal policy response in the region, as discussed 
below.   
  Second, the effectiveness of countercyclical policies – particularly that of fiscal policy – 
is likely to be quite different in Latin America from what it is in relatively large and relatively 
closed industrial countries such as the United States and Japan, or in a large and relatively closed 
emerging economy like China.  If fiscal stimulus is ineffective in open economies such as those 
in Latin America because it simply leads to additional spending on foreign goods, then there 
would be little to be gained in the form of domestic aggregate demand stimulation by adopting 
countercyclical fiscal policies.   
Third, and most importantly, the constraints on the implementation of countercyclical 
policies  are  quite  different  in  Latin  America  from  what  they  are  in  the  countries  that  have 
implemented large countercyclical programs to date. These constraints may substantially alter 
their payoff and feasibility. 
  The first constraint concerns fiscal sustainability and solvency. Latin American countries 
whose fiscal sustainability is precarious may find it very costly to undertake expansionary fiscal 
policies that imply larger fiscal deficits because their issuance of new debt may increase the 
market’s  perception  of  the  risk  that  these  governments  will  become  insolvent.    This  would 
further increase their borrowing costs, which would intensify the fiscal sustainability challenge   9
that these countries face.  An unsustainable fiscal path eventually entails either fiscal adjustment 
to retain solvency or debt restructuring, both of which are costly processes. Either way, Latin 
American countries that find themselves with precarious fiscal solvency may lack the “fiscal 
space”  needed  to  undertake  a  general  fiscal  expansion,  even  though  the  crisis  has  certainly 
created the “macroeconomic space” for them to do so. 
This constraint also applies to quasi-fiscal policies such as countercyclical credit policies 
to provide financial intermediation to segments of the private sector cut off from the normal flow 
of credit, such as exporters left without trade credit by international banks or small enterprises 
crowded out by large corporations turning to local bank financing after finding it difficult to 
secure external financing. To the extent that these policies only involve intermediation, there is 
no fiscal deficit and fiscal sustainability is unaltered. However, any recovery risk would amount 
to a contingent debt that would encumber fiscal solvency.  
  The second constraint concerns the high cost of borrowing. Larger fiscal deficits can be 
financed either by issuing new public sector liabilities or by drawing down public sector assets.  
The former was very costly at the outset of the crisis for all but the least risky countries in the 
world because of low risk appetite in international markets. A high cost of public borrowing 
would have been a constraint on countercyclical fiscal stimulus in Latin America because only 
high return expansions, including extending  credit to the private sector, would be worth the 
financial cost of borrowing to finance them.  
However,  this  constraint  can  be  overcome  by  relying  on  an  alternative    financing 
modality, in the form of liquid foreign exchange reserves.  Such reserves were  yielding very low 
returns  at  the  outset  of  the  crisis  and  therefore  provided  an  attractive  means  to  finance 
countercyclical  fiscal  deficits.    However,  reserve-financed  fiscal  expansion  is  subject  to  two 
important constraints of its own. 
  First, to the extent that creditors’ perception of sovereign risk depends  on the public 
sector’s net debt, the use of foreign exchange reserves to finance fiscal deficits would increase 
debt-servicing costs in the same way as would the issuance of new government debt to private 
creditors.  However, if high public sector borrowing costs arose for exogenous reasons – e.g., 
through the “monsoon effects” of a lower international risk appetite -- it may not have been very 
sensitive to fluctuations over the relevant range in the size of the public sector’s net debt.  The   10
upshot is that drawing down such assets would have little effect on the public sector’s debt 
servicing costs.  
   Even in this benign case, however, there is a second constraint.  The true opportunity cost 
of reserves has two components: the financial return on reserves and the liquidity benefits that 
they offer, in the form of protection against a self-fulfilling “sudden stop” of financing, to which 
even a solvent government may be vulnerable.  This protection represents an implicit “liquidity 
premium” on reserves, which makes them worth holding even when they offer a low financial 
yield.  The costs of reserve financing should thus include this foregone liquidity premium.  To 
the extent that Latin American countries remain vulnerable to liquidity crunches, this premium 
could be high.  Since the current crisis could have developed into a full-blown liquidity crisis 
where  access  to  credit  markets  would  have  been  lost,  the  high  cost  of  financing  a  fiscal 
expansion may remain a constraint even when reserves offer a seemingly low-cost alternative to 
borrowing, because prudence may suggest a limit to their use. 
4. The case for constrained fiscal expansion 
Combining the arguments made in the last section, a case can be made that it may not have been 
appropriate for fiscal policy to have responded countercyclically in Latin America.  If fiscal 
policy multipliers are small (as they might be in the more open economies in the region), then the 
amount of domestic aggregate demand stimulus that could be obtained for any given increase in 
public sector indebtedness through debt-financed spending increases or tax cuts may be too small 
to  justify  a  countercyclical  fiscal  response.
8    This  argument  becomes  stronger  when  debt 
financing is extremely expensive.  It becomes even stronger if, as is the case for some countries 
in the region, public sector debt stocks were already high relative to the debt-servicing capacity 
of the relevant governments, so that any increases in fiscal deficits would call for future fiscal 
adjustment and tend to threaten fiscal insolvency. 
 
 
                                                 
8 However there could still be a global justification to the extent that fiscal spillovers help foreign countries in 
similar circumstances.   11
1. The benefits of fiscal expansion 
  However, an alternative argument makes a persuasive case for fiscal expansion, possibly 
even in cases such as the immediately preceding ones.   
  Start from the observation that the social rate of return on well-designed public sector 
investments is likely to be quite high in Latin America at present.  There are at least two reasons 
to believe that this may be so: first, past resource misallocations during booms, and extended 
periods of fiscal stringency during busts, severely depleted the public sector capital stock in the 
region  over  the  past  three  decades,  indicating  that  public  investments  in  areas  such  as 
infrastructure, health, education, and internal security may have a high social payoff (Calderon 
and Serven 2004); second, the opportunity cost of many of the resources that would be absorbed 
by such spending would have been near zero at the outset of the crisis, since the crisis created 
substantial unutilized productive capacity in the region. 
  In addition to their potential for positive aggregate supply effects, it is quite likely that the 
aggregate demand effects of productive public expenditures of the types described above would 
prove to be stronger than would be suggested by simple analyses of fiscal multipliers based on 
the degree of openness of these economies, for a number of reasons: 
  First,  it  matters  what  the  government  spends  the  money  on.    Expenditures  on 
infrastructure,  health,  education,  and  internal  security  are  likely  to  be  heavily  nontraded-
intensive, providing a direct stimulus to domestic production.  In the parlance of the debate over 
stimulative spending proposals in the U.S. Congress at the onset of the crisis, spending of this 
type is “job-creating.”   
  Second, as mentioned above, the desire of private agents to move assets out of the region 
has created substantial pressure for nominal exchange rate depreciation in Latin America, at the 
same time that inflation rates have remained low.  To the extent that the implied real exchange 
rate depreciation is allowed to happen, it would be expected to create expenditure switching in 
favor of domestic goods in subsequent rounds of private-sector spending induced by the initial 
fiscal stimulus, increasing the fraction of such spending that is used to purchase domestic goods. 
  Third, to the extent that productive public investment reduces bottlenecks in domestic 
production and/or induces favorable expectations about the domestic availability of factors that   12
are  complementary  to  private  physical  capital,  it  should  be  expected  to  stimulate  domestic 
private  absorption  –  both  consumption  and  investment.    This  creates  the  potential  for  a 
significant “crowding in” effect that would increase the aggregate demand impact of the fiscal 
expansion. 
  Fourth, fiscal policy in the form of credit to viable segments of the private sector cut off 
from normal credit channels due to the liquidity crunch, in countries where the financial system 
is not supporting credit demand appropriately, may also have large social returns. Depending on 
the countries, external credit to the private sector in Latin America saw a pronounced surge in 
interest rates, outstripping that of sovereign borrowing, or an outright sudden stop. Furthermore, 
faced  with  substantial  macroeconomic  uncertainty,  in  some  countries  local  banking  systems 
resorted to a wait-and-see lending strategy with respect to the least creditworthy segment of 
borrowers, which feeds into the macroeconomic slowdown. 
  Fifth,  to  date,  Latin  America  has  largely  escaped  the  financial  sector  collapse  and 
domestic credit freezes that have made the crisis so severe in several OECD countries.  But 
financial systems in  Latin America are fragile,  and a sufficiently sizable real shock may be 
enough to threaten the perceived solvency of these systems.  This is an outcome that is urgent to 
avoid.  Not only would it substantially magnify the adverse short-run real effects of the crisis, but 
would also increase its fiscal costs and make its resolution much more complicated. In addition 
to these positive aggregate supply and demand effects, then, there may be a more urgent reason 
to have favored investment-intensive fiscal expansion (including active targeted credit policies) 
in Latin America at the onset of the crisis: if such spending can indeed ameliorate the effects of 
the adverse shocks on domestic economic activity, and if there are threshold effects in financial 
sector solvency, then minimizing the contraction in domestic economic activity to the greatest 
extent possible can play a critical role in protecting domestic financial systems.  The objective 
would be to avoid having the external shock trigger domestic financial crises that would have the 
potential of greatly magnifying the real as well as financial effects of the international crisis in 
Latin America.     
  Finally, aside from its macroeconomic effectiveness, an additional reason to have looked 
favorably on an increase in public investment spending and credit policies in Latin America as a 
crisis response is that such measures take up less “fiscal space” than other possible expansionary   13
fiscal programs.  Specifically, because it stimulates future output, public investment increases 
future tax revenues, and thus partly provides the means to service the additional debt (or make up 
for the lost revenue from reserves) to finance it (see Serven 2005).   
2. The problem of “fiscal space” 
  The  obvious  question,  however,  is  whether  Latin  America  had  any  “fiscal  space”  to 
undertake such a program in the first place.  As discussed above, an expansionary fiscal package 
that  does  not  square  with  a  credible  sustainable  rule  going  forward  may  trigger  a  harmful 
increase in default risk spreads. This is especially likely, of course, if the initial debt level is high 
relative to a government’s debt-servicing capacity.  There is indeed evidence that the effect of 
fiscal stimulus packages in high debt economies is worse than in low debt economies, and that 
the overall effect on growth is often negative (IMF 2008). In what follows we discuss the limits 
that fiscal space imposed on countercyclical fiscal expansion in Latin America as of early 2008. 
   The first observation to make is that, as mentioned previously, debt/GDP ratios among 
Latin  American  countries  had  fallen  substantially  by  the  end  of  2007,  suggesting  that  these 
countries may have had unused borrowing capacity at the onset of the crisis. This capacity could 
be enough to finance temporarily low fiscal balances resulting from the slowdown plus any 
additional countercyclical expansion. But the “fiscal space” implied by this unused borrowing 
capacity would not in itself validate a countercyclical expansion, that is to say a reduction in the 
structural primary surplus, if the value of the structural primary surplus in these countries was 
already  low  enough  as  to  imply  an  increasing  debt/GDP  ratio  in  the  future.    According  to 
Calderón and Fajnzylber (2009), structural primary balances rose by about 3 percentage points in 
the last decade despite the absence of strong fiscal rules, especially in countries with higher debt 
levels; the question is whether this improvement was enough to give countries a good footing 
looking to the future. To answer that question we need to compare the end-2007 values of the 
structural primary surpluses in these countries to the values that would have been required to 
sustain  the  current  low  debt/GDP  ratios.    To  do  so,  we  conduct  a  traditional  sustainability 
calculation for each of the LAC7 countries.
9   
                                                 
9 To abstract away from valuation effects, we will assume in the exercise below that the relevant real exchange rate was in long-term equilibrium, 
so that, on average, there are no valuation changes arising from real exchange rate changes.  This assumption appears reasonable; exchange rate 
flexibility in most countries has avoided any major real overvaluation that could cause a permanent debt explosion going forward.   14
  The situation for the LAC7 countries in 2007 is illustrated in Table 1.  The first two 
columns show the public debt ratio in each country as of end-2007 and their observed primary 
balance, respectively.
10 The next column shows the structural primary balance required for debt 
sustainability (the “target” structural balance), derived on the assumptions of a 3% real growth 
rate and 400 basis points of spread over a 3 percent real interest rate (i.e.,  
 























Reference  EMBI 
Spreads 
  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  b.p. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Argentina  55.6  3.2  3.2  2.4  -3.0  2.4  0.8  300 
Brazil  72.9  3.3  3.9  3.9  1.7  3.9  0.1  200 
Chile  14.6  9.4  0.6  6.8  1.6  1.6  -1.0  100 
Colombia  48.6  3.4  2.9  2.7  3.2  2.7  0.2  150 
Mexico  23.0  2.2  0.9  1.6  -1.9  -1.9  2.8  150 
Peru  29.6  4.9  1.2  2.5  -0.4  2.5  -1.3  150 
Venezuela  19.5  -1.2  0.8  0.1  -8.5  -8.5  9.3  350 
 
Source: LMW, IDB 2008, and Bloomberg.  
* 2006 
(1) Total Public Debt % of GDP. Data end of period, 2007. 
(2) LMW (2009) data in 2007 
(3) Total Public Debt (% of GDP - end of period) *(0.07-0.03) 
(4) y (4) from table 1 of Inter-American Development Bank, 2008 plus "Interest Payments: % of GDP" from LMW, 
IDB 2009. 
(7) (3)-(6) 
(8) Average 2007. Rounded to the nearest 50 
 
a long-run real interest rate of 7%), with the target balance augmented by a 1 percentage point 
security  margin  for  higher  debt  countries.
11  The  next  three  columns  provide  a  range  of 
estimations of the 2007 structural primary balances in each of these countries. The first two 
                                                 
10 Notice that, with the exception of Brazil, the initial public debt ratios in these countries were substantially below those that have recently been 
associated with increased perceptions of sovereign risk in industrial countries (e.g., according to the IMF’s GFS, 110 percent of GDP for Canada, 
76 percent for France, 71 percent for Germany, 116 percent for Italy, 189 percent for Japan, 68 percent for the U.K., and 74 percent for the U.S.). 
11 The security margin was added to Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, countries with debt/GDP over 30%. With that margin, these  countries 
would reach this indebtedness target in around 20 years (19, 26 and 15 respectively). We point out that in this illustration the long-run real 
interest rate net of GDP growth is the same for all countries (4%), which may be unrealistic.   15
estimations of the structural primary balance are based on different methods to isolate structural 
revenues from the observed series, in one case based on a standard filtering and in the other 
based  on  a  filtering  method  designed  to  mimic  the  Chilean  fiscal  rule  (after  adjusting  for 
structural breaks). (See IDB 2008 for details).  The first method may be appropriate for countries 
with temporary revenues closely associated with the GDP cycle, but would be inappropriate for 
countries  with  substantial  revenues  linked  to  volatile  commodity  prices,  such  as  Chile.  The 
second method is appropriate for Chile and may be appropriate for other countries with sizable 
commodity-linked  revenues.    In  this  sample  of  countries,  Mexico  and  Venezuela  are  more 
sensitive than Chile to a drop in commodity prices, and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru are 
less so.
12 The column that follows, which we will use as our reference structural primary balance 
for the purpose of this illustration, selects one or the other estimate of the structural primary 
balance  from  the  previous  two  columns,  depending  on  whether  revenues  are  more  or  less 
commodity-sensitive than Chile.
13 
  Column  (6)  presents  the  structural adjustment that  would be  required  to stabilize  the 
current  debt/GDP  ratio,  calculated  as  the  shortfall  between  the  estimated  structural  primary 
balance (reported in the “reference” column) and the target.  By this calculation, most countries 
were very close to the value of their structural primary balance that would be required to stabilize 
their debt/GDP ratios at their 2007 values.  An exception is Venezuela and, to a moderate extent, 
Mexico.
14  Alternatively, if the Chilean fiscal rule is used instead as a measure of structural 
balance for all countries except Brazil (the only one whose commodity-linked revenues do not 
exceed 2% of GDP), then Argentina would also fall into that group.  
  What  does  this  imply about ‘fiscal space’ in  the  region  at  end-2007?    In relation  to 
countries  not  far  off  their  sustainable  target,  there  is  nothing  particularly  desirable  about 
structural  primary  surpluses  that  would  sustain  current  debt/GDP  ratios  in  these  countries.  
Because debt/GDP ratios came down fairly dramatically for the LAC7 countries as a group from 
2003 to 2007, smaller-than-sustainable values of the structural primary deficit – i.e., values that 
would have implied an increase in the debt/GDP ratio –would have been unlikely to impair 
perceived fiscal solvency in most of these countries as long as they were transitory, unless there 
                                                 
12 Even though, with the exception of Brazil, their public commodity revenue exceeds 2% of GDP. 
13 This discrimination between commodity and non-commodity structural revenue is in the spirit of Vladkova-Hollar and Zettelmeyer (2008).    
14 Alternatively, with an adjustment rule forcing high debt countries to converge to an expected  30% debt-GDP in 10 years, their target primary 
balances would be higher: Argentina 4.4%, Brazil 6.6% and Colombia 3.5%. In that case,  Argentina and Brazil would also require a moderate 
adjustment similar to Mexico’s.    16
are  other  risk  factors.    Since  the  analysis  above  shows  that  most  LAC7  countries  were  not 
exploiting this fiscal space, it suggests that there was room for transitory fiscal expansions.   
  An alternative, market-based indicator of available fiscal space is given by the perceived 
default risk on external debt, as revealed by sovereign spreads. As indicated in column (7), in 
2007 Argentina and Venezuela were in a class of their own (their spreads were about twice as 
large  as  the  other  countries’),  even  prior  to  the  recent  global  increase  in  spreads  of  risky 
securities that pushed theirs to default levels. While this may be a noisy signal of sustainability 
(because it may also reflect a transitory bias towards a preference for not adjusting to make debt 
payments), it is nevertheless a relevant one for our purposes and it is largely consistent with our 
findings when indebtedness indicators are combined with sustainability calculations.  
  Our analysis therefore suggests that countercyclical fiscal policy should not reasonably 
have been ruled out as a valid policy aspiration in Latin America on grounds of inadequate 
“fiscal  space,”  although  the  scope  for  such  policies  may  indeed  have  been  constrained  by 
solvency concerns in some countries.  Specifically, the evidence above suggests that Chile was in 
a relatively comfortable situation in which fiscal space was clearly not a constraining factor, 
while Brazil, Colombia and Peru also had fiscal space for countercyclical expansion, though it 
was more limited than in Chile. In the case of Mexico fiscal policy already implied a pace of 
increase in the debt/GDP ratio that would have suggested caution about further expansion, unless 
it was limited and of short duration, although Mexico’s low debt level may have afforded it some 
leeway.    For  Argentina,  any  fiscal  stimulus  package  expanding  spending  beyond  its  trend 
(countercyclical spending) would probably have added to a deviation from the target structural 
primary balance and may reasonably have been deemed too risky in light of the country’s debt 
level and its previous fiscal experience. Finally, Venezuela was very far off fiscal sustainability 
and would probably have been ill-advised to consider further fiscal expansion.
 15   
  We take this exercise as an illustration of the kind of considerations that countries should 
take into account to determine their fiscal space and the extent to which countercyclical fiscal 
policy would be appropriate in their circumstances. The above evidence is not enough to reach 
firm conclusions except in the most extreme cases, but it is enough to show that the question of 
                                                 
15 Calderon and Fajnzylber (2009) construct an index of “lack of fiscal space” that takes into account debt burden, commodity dependence, 
financing costs and constraints, initial primary deficits, and expenditure rigidity for a set of countries that includes the LAC-7.  Their results are 
similar to ours, with Venezuela and Argentina being most constrained -- and Chile by far the least constrained -- among the LAC-7, while the 
other countries face only moderate constraints.   17
how to have participated in the multilateral effort of countercyclical fiscal policy in this global 
crisis was indeed relevant in Latin America.    
  What the analysis above shows is that for most of the major economies in Latin America, 
a modest temporary fiscal expansion would not have resulted in an important deviation from the 
fiscal stance required to stabilize their current low ratios of debt to GDP.  Moreover, the analysis 
is conservative for at least two reasons.  First, it fails to allow for any positive growth effect of 
well-chosen  infrastructure  investments.  Any  such  effects  would  tend  to  reduce  the  required 
structural primary balance, and thus generate more fiscal space.  Second, it fails to allow for 
dynamics in future fiscal policy. Any form of shoring up future fiscal discipline that would allow 
for discretionary fiscal contractions during future booms would serve the purpose of relaxing the 
sustainability  constraint  and  allowing  more  current  fiscal  stimulus.  For  example,  there  is 
evidence in G7 countries that discretionary countercyclical policy is asymmetric and generates a 
debt bias but automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance do not (IMF 2008). The 
reason is that automatic stabilizers are temporary, while discretionary policy tends not to be 
reversed  after  the  downturn.  Therefore,  the  introduction  of  automaticity  in  fiscal  policy 
(contingent rules) contributes to the credibility of discipline. More generally, addressing some of 
the  long-term  imbalances  such  as  deficits  in  pension programs  would  also  help  to  shore  up 
sustainability and open more space for fiscal action in this downturn. In particular, the space for 
beneficial countercyclical fiscal policy would be larger if countries were able to credibly commit 
to a change in the fiscal policy regime – specifically, to a fiscal policy rule that delivers larger 
structural balances in the upturn than have been recorded in recent years, instead of one that 
spends a fraction of the temporary revenues in boom periods because temporarily high revenues 
make fiscal balances look misleadingly healthy.  
5. Was this crisis the “rainy day”? 
One  objection  to  the  “fiscal  space”  analysis  of  the  previous  section  is  that  it  ignores  the 
temporarily high real borrowing costs that countries in the region faced. With the implication 
that fiscal expansion, even if prudent, would have been expensive.  However, such costs would   18
have been borne only if larger fiscal deficits had been financed by issuing new debt.  That was 
not the only option available to these countries at the outset of the crisis. 
  As indicated in Section 2, Latin American countries have accumulated large stocks of 
foreign exchange reserves in recent years.  The motivation for this accumulation has in part been 
as a form of self-insurance – i.e., as “rainy day” funds.  The opportunity cost of these reserves 
can be measured in two ways: as the foregone domestic investment that they could otherwise 
have financed, or as the cost of the additional public debt that would have been required to 
sterilize their monetary effects.  We have argued in previous sections that the social rate of return 
on productive public spending or targeted credit policies may have been particularly high under 
early-crisis conditions, and have documented that the cost of public sector debt in Latin America 
has been increased by the crisis, at the same time that the crisis itself, as well as the monetary 
policy response in industrial countries, has reduced interest rates on public sector securities in the 
United States.  The upshot of these arguments is that, however measured, the opportunity cost of 
reserves in Latin America became very high at the same time that their financial returns became 
very  low.    Ignoring  for  the  present  the  liquidity  premium  on  reserves  (but  see  below),  the 
implication is that there was a case for reserve-financed countercyclical fiscal policy in Latin 
America at the onset of the crisis, since the governments of the region could “borrow” more 
cheaply by drawing down reserves than by issuing debt on market terms.  In other words, the 
“rainy day”  for which the reserves were accumulated was at hand: the crisis represented an 
opportune  time  for  Latin  America  to  convert  a  significant  portion  of  its  foreign  exchange 
reserves  into  productive  public  spending.    The  large  stocks  of  foreign  exchange  reserves 
accumulated in recent years provided the needed funding for such investments, and the aggregate 
demand contraction resulting from the crisis provided the “macroeconomic space.”   
  Why not use reserves to finance countercyclical fiscal expansion?   There are two 
arguments to avoid doing so. 
1. Fear of floating 
  The first argument is that reserves are needed to avoid exchange rate depreciation.  If the 
central bank seeks to defend the exchange rate in the face of a desired change in the composition 
of  private  portfolios  from  domestic  assets  to  U.S.  government  liabilities,  it  would  have  to   19
accommodate the private sector’s increased demand for foreign securities by absorbing domestic 
securities in exchange for some part of its foreign exchange reserves.  If the central bank does 
not  accommodate  this  desire,  then  the  domestic  currency  would  depreciate  until  the  private 
sector  is  once  again  expecting  a  risk-adjusted  rate  of  return  on  domestic  securities  that  is 
commensurate with what it can expect to earn on foreign securities.  In the first case the central 
bank’s reserve stock would be at least partially depleted, while in the second case it would not.  
If reserves are not depleted by central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market – i.e., if 
the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  allowed  to  depreciate  to  accommodate  the  shift  in  the  private 
sector’s portfolio preferences, then the existing stock of foreign exchange reserves is available to 
finance deficit spending by the government.
16   
  This scenario assumes a floating exchange rate, though one which would absorb only the 
initial  depreciation  associated  with  the  increase  in  risk  premia,  and  not  the  additional 
depreciation that would be implied by central bank financing of fiscal deficits. 
There is nothing magical about this particular combination, however.  In principle, fiscal 
expansion and real exchange rate depreciation could both have been called upon to stimulate 
domestic economic activity in Latin America -- as indeed they were --  so one could argue that 
fiscal expansion should not be reserve-financed, but rather money-financed – i.e., the central 
bank should not sterilize the monetary effects of the government securities that it purchases to 
finance larger fiscal deficits.  Indeed, one could go further and suggest that the central bank 
could be even more aggressive in pursuing an expansionary monetary policy – not only refrain 
from sterilizing, but actually intervene in the opposite direction by purchasing not just newly-
issued government securities, but existing ones as well.  In other words, central banks in the 
region could have emulated the Fed by increasing the size of their balance sheets to provoke 
additional depreciation of the domestic currency.  Under early crisis conditions one could argue 
that this was unlikely to be inflationary. 
                                                 
16 From a textbook perspective, this could be accomplished by the sale to the central bank of the government securities required to finance such 
deficits.  When the government spends the proceeds of those sales, the central bank would prevent further depreciation of the currency beyond 
what is required to accommodate the initial portfolio shift by re-absorbing the increase in the base through sales of dollars in the foreign exchange 
market, resulting in a depletion of reserves with an unchanged base.  The upshot is that the exchange rate depreciates by the amount required to 
accommodate the initial portfolio reallocation, and the subsequent government deficits are financed by drawing down reserves.  Legal constraints 
on direct central bank lending to the government (a legacy of Latin America’s high-inflation past) may rule out the textbook approach in some 
countries.  However, the same result can be achieved indirectly, through central bank intervention in secondary government securities markets, 
indirect lending through the commercial banking system, or the transfer of a portion of reserves to sovereign wealth funds that would absorb the 
government bond emission.   20
  Such a policy runs into at least two potential constraints, however, not faced by the Fed: 
those posed by currency mismatches and by the past inflationary history of many countries in the 
region.
17   
  The  extent  to  which  exchange  rate  depreciation  can  complement  fiscal  expansion  in 
stimulating aggregate demand in individual countries depends on the degree to which currency 
mismatches  in  such  countries  would  cause  exchange  rate  depreciation  to  create  domestic 
financial  disruption by  impairing  the  net  worth  of domestic  financial  institutions, firms,  and 
governments with foreign currency liabilities that exceed their foreign currency assets.  Such 
vulnerability  creates  a  ceiling  beyond  which  the  price  of  foreign  exchange  would  trigger  a 
domestic financial crisis, and thus affects not just the desirable mix between fiscal expansion and 
exchange  rate  depreciation,  but  also  the  extent  to  which  debt-financed  fiscal  expansion  is 
feasible.    Countries  that  are  highly  vulnerable  to  dislocations  arising  from  such  mismatches 
require larger minimum reserve levels than those that are not so vulnerable, and they will have 
devoted  more  of  their  original  cumulated  reserve  stocks  to  preventing  the  exchange  rate 
depreciation  associated  with  the  portfolio  shift  implied  by  the  increase  in  risk  premia  on 
domestic assets.
18   
  The inflationary history of many countries in the region could also limit the effectiveness 
of this strategy.  If exchange rate pass-through remains important, or if monetary expansion 
undermines  the  anti-inflationary  credibility  of  central  banks,  upward  pressures  on  domestic 
prices could emerge even in the context of deficient capacity utilization.  This would not only 
diminish the extent of real depreciation stimulation that would be associated with any degree of 
nominal depreciation, but would also compound the macroeconomic challenge by adding the 
problem of inflation to that of recession. 
  However, recent changes in Latin America substantially diminish the force of both of 
these objections.  The evidence suggests both that currency mismatches have been substantially 
reduced  in  the  region,  and  that  central  banks  have  acquired  significant  anti-inflationary 
credibility (see IMF 2008).  Moreover, the point at which these constraints become binding 
                                                 
17 These constraints have figured prominently in the “fear of floating” literature (see Calvo and Reinhart 2002). 
18 In extreme cases, the reserve-financed fiscal program proposed in the last section would simply not be feasible for such countries.  If public 
investment is nevertheless perceived as highly productive, their fiscal options would be to undertake such spending on a pay-as-you-go basis (i.e., 
through balanced-budget spending), to incur high-cost debt (if possible) in order to fund higher-return projects, or to rely only on automatic 
stabilizers.   21
depends  on  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  the  demand  for  monetary  base  in  Latin  American 
countries.  To the extent that the crisis has expanded the demand for base money, this would 
have facilitated the financing of fiscal deficits through seignorage, rather than by drawing down 
foreign  exchange  reserves.    If  the  opposite  is  true,  then  some  of  the  central  banks’  foreign 
exchange reserves would have been required to limit the extent of exchange rate depreciation to 
what it would have been in the absence of a change in the demand for base money, leaving 
correspondingly less room for reserve-financed fiscal deficits. 
2. Exposure to future liquidity risk 
  The second argument is that a strategy of spending reserves is too risky, because it would 
leave countries exposed to future liquidity risks.  This can be viewed as a claim that the “rainy 
day”  analysis  above  undervalues  the  opportunity  cost  of  reserve  financing  by  ignoring  the 
liquidity  premium  –  i.e.,  by  implicitly  assuming  that  financing  is  always  available  for 
prospectively solvent governments on normal terms.  But liquidity risk could clearly become a 
major consideration if, say, a W-shaped recovery from the global financial crisis threatens to 
produce a temporary sudden stop of external financing.  In this case countries with difficult or no 
access to financing - that is, those undergoing a sudden stop - would be forced to rely on their 
own  reserves  to  finance  their  flow  payment  obligations  with  a  stock,  and  would  therefore 
become increasingly exposed to liquidity risk as time passes.  
  Vulnerability  to  such  creditor  panics  actually  varies  substantially  across  countries  in 
Latin America. An important factor underlying such vulnerability across countries is the maturity 
profile of their public debt. Table 2 shows indicators of the public sector financing gap that 
would have emerged for various countries if, on top of expected fiscal deficits, market debt were 
not rolled over (short-term debt plus amortization payments on other debt falling due in 2009/10 
plus the estimated fiscal deficit).  
As the table indicates, there were a number of countries with a sizable potential financing 
gap for which the dominant factor was public market debt amortization to be rolled over (short 
term debt at remaining maturity). The wide range of variation of sovereign risk spreads across 
countries in the region may indeed partly reflect vulnerability to liquidity risk, rather than more 
conventional solvency considerations.  For perspective, it is worth noting that the regular public   22
 
Table 2: Liquidity Risk in LAC countries 
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sector financing needs described in this table (a yearly average of about $300 billion) dwarf the 
funding needed for moderate countercyclical fiscal policy, which for the region as a whole would 
have amounted to less than $30 billion, or 10% of the total (see estimations in Izquierdo and 
Talvi, 2009).
19  
  What  are  the  implications  of  this  regional  exposure  to  liquidity  risk?    An  obvious 
interpretation is that the liquidity premium on reserve holdings was quite high indeed, implying 
that market borrowing, even at high rates and short maturities, would have been preferable to – 
less expensive than - drawing down reserves to finance countercyclical fiscal policies.  But the 
                                                 
19 Moderate countercyclical policy is defined as an autonomous expansion of 2% of GDP, the target proposed by the US to G20 countries, which 
for Latin America is about a yearly average of about $30 billion. However, because of its stimulative effects, the net expansion in the fiscal 
deficit can be conservatively estimated  to be smaller than $30 billion. In fact, considering a spending Keynesian multiplier of 1.8 and a revenue-
GDP elasticity of  0.9, such expansion would imply revenues expanding by some 1% of GDP (from a basis of about 30% of GDP), or an yearly 
average of $20 billion.   23
recommendation to passively continue with market financing as long as it is accessible (i.e., until 
a liquidity crunch occurs) is not unassailable.  The reason is that the indicators of financial 
vulnerability in Table 2 may actually be rather misleading, in several ways.  
  First and foremost, in contrast to the past, an external sudden stop of market financing 
would not necessarily have implied a sharp fiscal contraction this time around.  Domestic debt is 
now the prevalent form of public market debt for many countries in the region, including Brazil 
and the rest of the larger countries, which are shown in Table 2 as facing relatively high liquidity 
risk. Aggregate market rollover needs in Latin America have been less than 15% external in 
recent years. Therefore it can be argued that the above risk spreads, which are applicable to 
external debt, are not revealing of potential risks associated with access to financing for such 
countries. In fact, domestic sources of finance are often captive (e,g. pension funds).  To some 
extent this may make them more a form of taxation than of market borrowing, but in any case 
this leaves them in the role of providing funds when needed, and therefore of protecting against 
sudden stops of external funds.
20  
  Second, a  sudden  stop  in  external market  financing  does not  mean  a sudden  stop  in 
external  financing.    As  indicated  previously,  official  creditors  played  an  important  role  in 
ameliorating a potential liquidity crunch in the current crisis.  Official lending stepped up to the 
plate in this global crisis and increased financial support to several countries, thus alleviating the 
constraint imposed by costly and unreliable external market debt. This holds true for the IDB and 
the WB, which rapidly expanded their lending programs to sovereigns all across Latin America 
for fiscal and quasi-fiscal spending purposes.  It also holds true for the IMF, which received very 
substantial new funding at the April 2009 G20 meeting to back up the international reserves of 
developing countries, and to lend if need be, and quickly signed agreements with several Latin 
American countries for more than $60 billion.
21 These efforts followed the $30 billion credit 
                                                 
20 However it is not clear that these tax-like sources of finance can be stretched much further, and if they cannot be then the risk information on 
external debt may still be a relevant indicator of liquidity risk at the margin. Argentina is an example of a country in which there is a solid 
domestic anchor to ensure the bulk of the required fiscal financing despite a lack of access to external credit, but that still faces a challenge in 
finding sources of finance for its stimulus package. 
 
21 The low conditionality associated with some of these facilities may  ease the stigma that has been associated with recourse to IMF funding in 
the recent past.   24
lines that the US Fed made available to Mexico and Brazil. The point is that the weakness of 
external credit markets has been offset by a strong response by official creditors.
22   
Third, even if a sudden stop of overall external market funding materializes and mandates 
a current account adjustment, the economic damage likely to be done by that adjustment is likely 
to be much smaller than in the past.  This is so because countries in LAC are not currently 
running large current account deficits, implying smaller required changes in real exchange rates 
(and current accounts) if a sudden stop materializes, as well as because the reduction in the 
severity of currency mismatches in many countries of the region implies that such real exchange 
rate adjustments as would be required would tend to be much less financially disruptive than 
they have been in the past. 
  Fourth, in any case, as mentioned above, countries accumulated substantial reserves to 
meet financing needs in a downturn like the current one, amassing reserve stocks to the tune of 
half a trillion dollars in the aggregate, a figure that is very high by historical standards. A clear 
example is Chile, which saved the temporary portion of copper-related revenues during the boom 
years in a $20 billion fund which was available to finance its fiscal spending and would go a long 
way to achieve that even if Chile had suffered from a sudden stop. As a consequence of these 
reserve stocks, liquidity indicators were at record highs in the early stages of the crisis. Chart 1 
shows the evolution of international reserves (R) relative to all external debt coming due in 2008, 
or short-term debt at remaining maturity (S). This liquidity indicator r = R/S is in the spirit of the 
so-called Guidotti-Greenspan indicator, which has a conventional associated safety threshold of 
100%. Chart 2 shows current values for individual countries; almost all of which exceed that 
threshold.
23 
  Finally, given the values of reserve stocks and countries’ flow financing needs, the 
liquidity value of reserve stocks at the margin (and thus the size of the liquidity premium) 
depends on the duration of any sudden stop of external financing.  A countercyclical stimulus 
package of some 2% of regional GDP over 2009-10, under conservative assumptions on its net 
                                                 
22 Official lenders able and willing to extend financial assistance under these circumstances would be enabling countries not only to implement 
appropriate countercyclical policies but, in some cases, to avoid enormous unnecessary costs associated with fiscal retrenchment in a severe 
recession. Multilaterals have an important countercyclical role to play in relaxing a financing constraint that may condemn countries to inaction 
or even to procyclical adjustment when a more active fiscal policy would be advisable.  
 
23 This indicator underestimates the situation in countries with sizable short-term foreign bank deposits (included in the denominator) offset by 
bank international reserves (excluded from the numerator), such as Uruguay.   25
impact on the fiscal deficit, would have entailed a reserve loss of less than 10 percent of the total.  
Assume that 10 percent of end-2007 reserves were indeed used to finance such a package.  If the  























Source: WEO, April 2009. Aggregate stock of reserves at year-end as percentage of aggregate outstanding short-
term debt at remaining maturity. 
 
duration of any liquidity crunch was sufficiently short as to nevertheless leave ample reserves 
even after such reserve use, the foregone liquidity benefit of such reserves (and thus the liquidity 
premium that should be attached as a cost to their use) is essentially zero.  The same is true if the 
crunch were to last long enough to exhaust reserves even without reserve financing of the fiscal 
expansion.  Abstaining from a fiscal response in order to hoard reserves would therefore be 
useful – and reserve use should therefore be charged a liquidity premium at the margin - only in 
the very unlikely event that the liquidity crunch is just the right size, neither too small (no need) 
nor too large (no use).




                                                 
24 In the latter case the adjusting variable would have to be either special financing from official creditors willing to support multilateral demand 
stimulus or debt restructuring. 
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Chart 2: External Liquidity Indicator for Individual Countries, 2008. 
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Source: WEO, April 2009. Percentage of stock of reserves at year-end, to short-term debt outstanding, remaining 
maturity basis. TTO, PRY, PAN, BHS and SUR not displayed (exceed 1250%) 
   
Abstaining from active fiscal policy to hoard reserves is therefore a largely arbitrary way 
to deal with the exogenous uncertainty of a continuing (or deepening) global liquidity crisis. 
Another implication of the same observation is that in order to safeguard against a prospective 
future  liquidity  crisis  fiscal  policy  should  actually  turn  sharply  contractionary  under  current 
circumstances, rather than simply abstaining from fighting the slowdown: it does not appear 
plausible  to  deny  otherwise  appropriate  countercyclical  fiscal  policy on  grounds  of financial 
prudence without at the same time concluding that there is instead a need for drastic procyclical 
fiscal adjustment.  
 
3. Reserves and liquidity 
In  any  event,  irrespective  of  the  extent  to  which  countercyclical  fiscal  policy  is 
implemented,  given  the  size  of  public  sector  borrowing  requirements,  the  policy  question 
remains  whether,  on  the  margin,  countries  should  borrow  from  markets  or  utilize  reserves   27
instead. It is useful to note in this comparison that the liquidity squeeze produced by reserves-
financed spending is not necessarily far greater than that resulting from debt-financed spending 
when debt becomes “precarious” in the terminology of Izquierdo and Talvi (2009), because in 
that case rolling over debt is also costly in terms of liquidity. Perhaps surprisingly, if the maturity 
of debt rolled over is sufficiently short, using reserves may actually be a preferable option in 
terms of liquidity as measured by the liquidity indicator.  
Consider, for example, the benchmark steady state case in which the liquidity indicator r 
= R/S is constant period after period, where short-term debt at remaining maturity S is a fraction 
2/(m+1) of overall debt (here m is the average maturity of  total debt; see the appendix).  Then as 
long as debt is rolled over at the same maturity m, r remains constant. Now consider a shock in 
which debt is instead rolled over at a shorter maturity m’.  If the credit crunch is severe and only 
short-term loans, say m’=1, are available, the liquidity gap between reserve and loan financing is 
(r - (1+p*))/p*(1+p*), where p* = (m-1)/m. Then, if the initial liquidity ratio is large, utilizing 
reserves to pay off debt instead of rolling it over may actually increase the liquidity ratio. The 
appendix  shows  that  if  rolled  over  debt  is  all  short  term  (m’=1),  this  surprising  result  is 
guaranteed to obtain when initial liquidity is above 200% (r > 2).
25  The upshot is that in a 
liquidity crunch, the additional liquidity cost of using reserves instead of refinancing with short-
term debt when reserves are plentiful may be small. 
  Our arguments in this section for reserve financing rather than issuing new debt can 
readily be given a simple formal interpretation.  Let F = amortization + budget deficit be the 
amount that a government needs to finance each period by using reserves or rolling over debt.  
Suppose that M is the amount of new market debt issued (for now we assume that there is no 
non-market lending) and W the amount financed with reserves. Between the two they have to 
satisfy the total public sector financing requirement, so that M + W = F. The level of reserves in 
the subsequent period is (R – W) and the stock of short-term debt in that period is (a + M), where 
a is predetermined amortizations, to which amortization of new borrowing M is added (to 
simplify notation, the unit period coincides with its maturity, so by definition m’=1 and 
amortization is full).  The liquidity indicator in the next period is therefore given by r = (R -
W)/(a + M). Let the (net) cost of borrowing be cM, where c >0 is the gap between the market 
                                                 
25 As time passes, the conditions for this result become tighter.   28
interest rate on new debt and the financial return on reserves.  Suppose that the liquidity value of 
reserves is given by qr, where q is a parameter that determines the weight given to the liquidity 
indicator r. The value of q would depend on the various factors discussed in this section, such as 
the actual costs associated with any credit crunch and the likelihood that such a crunch would 
actually become binding. The optimal financing decision can therefore be expressed as the 
solution to the following problem: 
 
{ }
 F  W   s.t. M 
 M) W)/(a  (R   where  r cM qr Max
W M
= +
+ - = -                                          
,  
 
In  this  formulation  we  take  financial  needs  F  as  given  and  focus  on  the  portfolio 
allocation of funding sources. The solution is given in the appendix.  For very large q, only 
liquidity matters. Barring the case mentioned above in which initial reserves are so plentiful that 
using them is the best way to protect liquidity, in the “normal” case (identified in the appendix) 
reserves would therefore not be used. In fact, new borrowing would cover not just full debt 
rollover plus the budget deficit, but also additional borrowing in order to accumulate reserves 
(W<0).  In  other  words,  an  extreme  focus  on  liquidity  risk  ought  to  lead  to  a  policy 
recommendation of full market debt rollover and more.  However, when the various reasons 
discussed above cause the weight q assigned to liquidity risk to be moderate (or more precisely, 
when the cost of market borrowing is very large relative to the return on reserves, so that q/c is 
moderate), the optimal strategy is a mixed solution involving some use of reserves and some 
borrowing. In that case, it is important to notice that, ceteris paribus, a larger initial stock of 
reserves R leads to a higher use of reserves W, and therefore less market borrowing M, in the 
optimal solution.  
  Official  financial  support  would  ease  the  liquidity  crunch  by  providing  financing  at 
medium and long-term maturities (and low cost). To simplify, let’s assume that official lending L 
has a grace period so that it does not impact next-period amortization, and that its cost is equal to 
the return on reserves, so that we need not keep track of its net cost. Let’s assume (without loss 
of generality as we will see) that official creditors lend to reserves, so that initial reserves are 
now R + L. Then, replacing R by R + L, the maximization problem above remains the same. In   29
particular, the effect would be that financing out of reserves (W) increases. Alternatively, if 
official creditors lend for budget support, so that there is a new funding source L in the constraint 
(M+W+L=F),  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  problem  would  be  unchanged.  In  fact,  solving  the 
constraint for W and substituting, in both cases r = (R + L + M - F)/(a + M), and therefore 
nothing changes. Lending for reserve support (or backing them up) is the same as lending for 
budget support (or “refinancing short term market debt”).  The way in which official creditors 
provide liquidity is irrelevant to the country’s decision to borrow from markets.
26 Under any 
form, official financial support boosts “effective” reserves.  
The model above is incomplete because it is conditional on public financing requirements 
F, which is of course a policy variable at the center of the question of countercyclical fiscal 
policy. A more complete model would recognize that there is a tradeoff between its financing 
costs, minimized above, and its benefits f(F), assumed to be subject to decreasing returns (f’>0, 
f”<0). Expressing official lending L as an additional financing item, the model becomes: 
 
{ } ( )
 F L   W  s.t. M 
 M) W)/(a  (R where  r F f cM qr Max
F W M
= + +
+ - = + -                             
, ,  
 
This model is solved in the appendix. The model previously considered concentrates the 
problem on a given spending F. The new piece added by this more complete model is how 
exogenous variables affect the determination of optimal fiscal policy F* and, consequently, its 
financing. As mentioned, it is easy to check by substituting W from the budget constraint into the 
function, that official lending L and initial reserves R play the same role: what matters is R+L. 
The appendix shows that when either reserves or official lending increases, optimal fiscal policy 
F* is larger but market borrowing M* is smaller: expanding fiscal policy would be financed by 
official lending and reserves. Multilateral lending, whether for reserve support or for budget 
support, contributes to the “rainy day” case argued in this paper as an optimal response. 
                                                 
26 Official creditors could only influence such decisions by imposing conditionality that distorts the country’s perceived optimal tradeoff. 
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6.  Conclusions:  Was  Latin  America  right  to  conduct  expansionary  fiscal 
policy this time around?   
 
Before the Great Recession, many countries in Latin America accumulated very large chests of 
international reserves that could serve as “rainy day” funds against adverse macroeconomic 
events, partly at the expense of productive public investments that could otherwise have been 
implemented with those funds.  The rainy day arrived in 2008, with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September.  By and large, Latin American countries responded with fiscal expansion. 
Countercyclical spending measures were concentrated on infrastructure investment, programs to 
support small- and medium-sized enterprises weakened by the crisis, and social safety net 
programs (see CEPAL 2009 for details). Barring Venezuela, which we found to be lacking 
sustainability preconditions, the LAC-7  countries analyzed in the text carried out substantial 
fiscal expansion (e.g. 3.6 points of GDP in Perú) and where necessary reformed rules to facilitate 
such policies (e.g. Chile’s structural budget target was temporarily lowered). In fact, on average, 
these seven countries engineered a deterioration of their structural fiscal balance of 0.6% of GDP 
(IDB 2010).
27 Forty percent of the expansion of fiscal spending in these countries consisted of 
capital expenditure. Until dwindling private credit recovered, they financed these measures using 
accumulated reserves and official credit. In fact, the systematic accumulation of international 
reserves over the years stopped and actually went into reverse in the first quarter of 2009, when 
about 5% of the stock of reserves was spent (amounting to also about 5% of quarterly GDP). 
Reserve depletion only stopped in the second quarter after the G20 London meeting securing 
official liquidity and credit to cash-strapped countries, to resume accumulation as private 
markets kept normalizing. On top of official commitments and market normalization, actual official net 
                                                 
27 The observed fiscal balance deteriorated by 3.4% of GDP, a full point above that of the typical Latin American 
country. This fiscal expansion underestimates the power of countercyclical fiscal policy in countries with active 
credit policies through public banks. In Brazil public banks were capitalized by some 3% of annual GDP and their 
credit grew by half in 2009, to become the main source of bank credit.  
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financial flows to Latin America in 2009 increased by some 40 billion dollars, which amounts to almost 
10% of international reserves or 2% of GDP.
28).  
The question is whether it was appropriate to follow expansionary policies and use these 
contingency funds at that time to cushion domestic economies against the consequences of the 
most severe international crisis since the 1930s. While this issue has been controversial, this 
paper has argued that it was indeed appropriate to do so ex ante.  Well-managed reserve-financed 
public investment programs in Latin America could be designed to fill an important deficiency in 
the  availability  of  productive  public  goods  while  stimulating  domestic  aggregate  demand, 
thereby minimizing the effects of the adverse external shocks that the crisis has generated on real 
economic activity.  By doing so, it would have safeguarded the health of domestic financial 
sectors, avoiding the triggering of mechanisms that could potentially have greatly magnified both 
the real and financial effects of the crisis in the absence of the Asian emerging markets recovery.  
The  amount  of  “fiscal  space”  available  to  undertake  such  spending  varied  from  country  to 
country, but the cushion afforded by the foreign exchange reserves that were accumulated during 
pre-crisis years provided a source of financing that could be advantageously drawn upon by 
countries that were not constrained by currency mismatches or extensive exchange rate pass-
through. 
The increased resources for multilateral liquidity provision that were deployed by the 
international community reinforce the case for reserve financing of active fiscal policy. This 
would have been true irrespective of whether official lending took the form of reserve support or 
budget support; this distinction is irrelevant for the country’s decision concerning financing with 
reserves or through market borrowing. 
                                                 
28 According to the April 2010 World Economic Outlook, this amount includes not only official credit but also 
transactions in external assets and liabilities of official agencies.   32
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Appendix 
Shock to the steady-state liquidity case. 
  Suppose that a country contracts new loans each year in the amount S, with a uniform 
maturity of m years.  In steady state, the outstanding debt D consists of the sum of the surviving 
principals  S/m,  2S/m,…,mS/m=S  on  the  debt  contracted  over  the  previous  m  years.    The 
amortization due each period (on loans contracted over the previous m periods) is S = 2D/(m+1) 
(we refer to this as “short-term debt at remaining maturity”). As long as debt due S is rolled over 
at the same maturity m, S and D remain constant and, assuming reserves R are constant as well, 
so does the liquidity ratio r = R/S.  
  In a credit crunch, however, new loans are available only at maturity m’< m. 
We consider the following two alternatives:  
1.  Roll over debt.  
In this case, in the next period S’= S(1+p), where p = (m-m’)/mm’= p =1/m’-1/m > 0.  This 
is obtained as the sum of new amortization S/m’ and predetermined amortization of the loans 
contracted over the previous m -1 years (m-1)S/m = p*S. Liquidity in the following period 
becomes r(1) = r/(1+p) < r. Notice that when there is no change (m’= m), the steady state 
obtains (p = 0).  In the extreme case in which m’=1 (short term rollover), p = p* = (m-1)/m.  
2.  Pay with reserves.  
In this case reserves diminish by the amount of the amortization payment due, to R’= 
R - S, while payments due in the following period diminish to S’ = Sp* (only predetermined 
amortization). Therefore r(2) = R’/S’ = (R – S)/Sp* = (r -1)/p*. 
When maturity contraction is maximal (p = p*) and therefore the liquidity concern is at 
its highest, the liquidity gain of paying with reserves is  
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Perhaps surprisingly, in this case, r > 2 is a sufficient condition for the use of reserves to 
improve the liquidity indicator in the following period – i.e., for r(2) > r(1). 
Optimal funding of public sector borrowing requirements 
The public sector solves: 
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When k > 0 (the “normal” case), liquidity improves when debt is rolled over instead of 
paid off (r’ > 0) and the above problem has a unique interior solution M*. It is easy to check that 
M* is directly related to the weight (q/c): dM*/d(q/c)) > 0. 
The comparative statics with respect to initial reserves R yields dM*/dR < 0. To see this, 
consider the derivative with respect to R of the FOC which, apart from the factor q/c > 0,  yields 
.      M) /(a  - 0 1
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The complete model, again substituting W into the function yields: 
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Assuming  that  f(F)  is  sufficiently  concave  (reducing  spending  to  gain  liquidity  is 
increasingly  costly),  the  SOC  of  the  enlarged  problem  ensures  an  interior  minimum 
0
2 2 > = FM MM  r  f''-  q q r ∆ . 
Totally differentiating the FOCs with respect to L (or R) and solving, it is easy to check 
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